

CHAPTER III

THE DIALECTICAL ACT

A) CREATIVE ANALYSIS

ART. 1: The analytic method is the initial step by which individual consciousness is constituted.

The analytic method is no more than an extension of the reflexive act. Like reflexion it has a progressive character; it is the sole method that can be employed by a being who, not in himself a creative source, discovers rather than invents the world – but nonetheless has an original perspective on this discovery by means of which he can shape his own being. In order to understand the scope and value of analysis one must view it in the right way. There can be no question of straightaway supposing an All¹ that contains everything we will ever discover in the precise form we will one day find it. Here a very simple argument might satisfy: the analysed All cannot be the same as the non-analysed All, hence through a kind of contradiction the analysis that supposes the All will always

¹ For Lavelle “the All” is a synonym for Pure Being, i.e. eternal, undifferentiated being. With respect to the temporal domain it can be conceived as a storehouse of possibilities from which particular beings are generated as well as their elaborated world. In itself a seamless unity it contains in potential all that will ever be known in the realm of multiplicity.

have to be augmented. Also analysis of the All can be carried out in an infinite number of ways. In reality what we perceive of it (i.e. that by which we shape our personal being) exists only in us and by rapport with us; it implies an indefinite enrichment for those who live in time but not for the All which is the eternal ground and possibility of that enrichment.

The All is more a point of departure for analysis than a point of arrival for synthesis. There is no path to or from it. But all paths are situated in the All, and each being creates and situates his essence between the points of departure and arrival called birth and death. His life is an exploration of Being. It is always present to him and he remains distinct from it only in that his participation is ever limited and imperfect.

But each of our initiatives implies both a revelation and a personal choice through which our I inscribes its existence in the absolute. The latter surpasses it yet continues to support it, giving sustenance, possibility and efficacy to all the ventures of our freedom.

I am plunged in a universe that bears me and nourishes me. My life draws from it all that it is. It cuts a furrow in it that is new to me but eternal for it. The creative act's fecundity is one with the power of choice that permits me, through a continual analysis, to select from it the elements that will compose the substance of my being. And we suppose that the greatest of mysteries is that this action introduces us into Being without adding anything to it and that while it takes place in time it nonetheless inscribes us in eternity.

Pure analysis manifests in two forms, one very like the other. It is above all the operation that enables us to discern in the world those elements we require to shape our personal life; analysis already plays a part in their creation since the elements exist only when isolated, i.e. through the choice made of them. But through a subtler operation we put into play one after another the various powers that appear in the act so that we can participate in it; participation itself creates them as powers. Only, this bi-fold analysis cannot be detached from the All that gives it birth and to which it is applied. It ought never to lose sight of it; it constantly interprets the All according to our unique perspective: it constitutes it in the first instance as a system of elements that can never be identified with the All yet nonetheless allows me to take hold of it through thought and action; in the second instance as a living dialectic that multiplies the means of communication I can have with the various aspects of the spiritual universe.

ART. 2: Analysis shatters the unity of the pure act in order to make way for synthesis, which constitutes the All of the universe.²

There is much vanity in thinking analysis is always secondary to synthesis on the grounds that the latter must first posit the All for the former to be able to

² A confusing turn of phrase in light of what has already been said of the All. Strictly speaking it is prior to the universe of actualities. Nonetheless it is clear that what is now in question is the whole of manifestation.

reduce it to elements. But it might be argued to the contrary that the All is the All only after it has been reconstituted through a synthesis of the elements provided by analysis; ahead of analysis there is only a unity, and the possibility of analysing it according to different methods means the All can be obtained through an infinite number of syntheses, as evidenced by the variety of world-views and philosophical systems. As a result the analyses and syntheses we put into play change character according to the departure we take, the end we pursue, our dispositions and aesthetic preferences. The role of free will and subjectivity in these matters should not be underestimated, though in fact the different views must in some sense agree because they all proceed from the depths of the same All. Which greatly limits the constructive value synthesis would like to claim but straightaway gives it ontological value since synthesis never departs Being and since it puts Being at our door so to speak.

The words "analysis" and "synthesis" define the original character of the mind's activity and indeed show us the I's rapport with the real and the very secret of participation. Whatever meaning is attributed to metaphysics depends on how these two terms are interpreted. The peculiarity of idealism is to affirm the superiority of synthesis while that of realism is to maintain that synthesis is incomprehensible if not first subordinated to analysis, i.e. if Being is not posited first. But if Being is one with the act that posits it then synthetic activity is always correlative of a prior analysis since it borrows from Being the very powers it employs and the materials it puts into play. These materials appear in participation only to show the limits of an operation and the response the real is always ready to provide it. There is consequently little ground for the criticism that there is no progress in the analytic method because being is delivered in a pre-fabricated form: for we also draw from being the contrast between a power belonging to us and a correlative "given" that reflects our perspective on the universe. In this way we impart creative expression to both our own being and the face the world shows us.

The assumption of analysis is that we are situated in an All we have not brought forth and are unable to embrace in a single regard. We can place our attention on only one point at a time. Nonetheless we can choose that point. The relations we maintain with others depend as a whole on where our attention is continually placed and on the changes our liberty effects in the real world. So it is our thinking that makes the elements of analysis stand out, and the original synthesis that puts them in order is the result—less owing to our activity than to the response the real gives us by taking a configuration consistent with its own laws so to speak while at the same time supporting the slant of our consciousness. In other words the synthetic method is the consequence of analytic operations through which, one after another, we enter into contact with the real in order to shape our personal life and very being.

We see therefore that, by a kind of paradox, regression takes us back to the original unity of all syntheses while the progressive diversity of their modes—

without altering that unity – shows the analytic deployment so to speak. Those who imagine that analysis is imperfect and elective will see that on the contrary it is how we introduce our limited being into the world, i.e. by requiring it to contribute to the world's creation.

From an etymological perspective intelligence is no more than the act by which one discerns the elements of the real; to will is to choose; to love is to prefer; in each of the characteristic operations of consciousness we strike on the analytic nature of the act of participation, which is immediately transformed into a synthesis formative of ourselves and the world and which in itself is only a product of what we have discerned, chosen and preferred.

We understand therefore that we could never acquire knowledge according to the universal, inflexible method described by Descartes, which by combining the simple with the simple yields, one after another, all the various degrees of complexity. That method is suitable only for putting in order what has just been discovered. But all forms of knowledge support one another; I advance more by way of diverse routes and chance encounters than by way of reason. And every new result I obtain changes all the others: I discover unforeseen connections. Even my point of departure seems new to me whenever I go back to it. Consequently it is impossible for my knowledge to have steady growth according to a principle; on the contrary it manifests a circle-like solidarity without definite beginning.

ART. 3: The world is a system we continually develop for the sake of thought and abandon in order to live.

The mind is interested in making a system where every part is supported and illumined. By gathering the totality of the world into an aggregate of circumscribed, articulated concepts, the mind gains consciousness of its superiority over things, assigns a place to each of them, makes each a cog in a vast machine whose operation the mind regulates; at the same it enjoys an aesthetic satisfaction comparable to what we feel before an architectural edifice we have constructed and live in. However philosophy goes beyond system, or if you will, the systems it builds are abstract while what fills them must always be concrete; they are rigid while the experience that penetrates them softens them; since they tend to close up they need to be opened so that their ramifications can be indefinitely extended.

System moreover is triply checked as soon as we stop taking it as a game designed to give us pleasure from following agreed-upon rules. For where system is concerned every living being enjoys a unique and privileged position; his perspective on the world is valid for him alone; within a system common to everybody his perspective is a sub-system known only to him. Secondly his entire existence is a series of encounters; but each encounter becomes an event in which the world acquires for him a spiritual and personal meaning that no

system succeeds in expressing. Finally since each of his actions, once proposed, leads to repercussions conforming to the system's rules it is obvious that at the moment he proposes the action he rises above the system and only contributes to producing elements that will later be systematically arranged. The world is therefore a system we make in order to think about it and abandon in order to live in it. The essential thing, regardless of our point of departure, is that our connection with the All is never defective. That in itself is the true system which is at the same time always an open system.

Hence instead of a method allowing us to construct the real through a temporal process which, lacking the power to go from nothing to something, would proceed only from the simple to the complex, the ideal of a system would show us a perfect subordination of different aspects of the world such that whichever aspect was posited first we could recover all the rest. That is to say, if we always remain in contact with the real we will successively discover truths that can be appended. This should happen even without anyone proposing a system which is that of things in themselves³ and not a framework put together by me which requires my cutting things to measure in order to make them fit in, which only translates to the law by which the world constantly develops itself, though with the constant collaboration of thinking and willing.

B) FROM THE DIALECTIC OF CONTRADICTION TO THE DIALECTIC OF PARTICIPATION

ART. 4: *Our dialectic describes the various processes of creative analysis.*

As a starting-point and support for whatever dialectical method, can there be a more beautiful principle than that of a possibility which allows each being to realise himself through an act that is up to him to accomplish, which in the same stroke or operation illumines the nature of the world as well as his own nature, and which indivisibly renders him creator of himself and collaborator in the entire work of creation?

Can there be a more living dialectic than one that, instead of engaging in a mechanical play of contradictions, raised and resolved, immediately addresses the initial and constant experience of the distinction between the participator and the participated⁴, describing the conditions and aspects of this distinction in the very operations through which our activity discovers it and puts it into play? This relationship is justified by its realisation. It is an act accomplished by us at

³ This calls to mind the "To the things themselves!" prescriptions of the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl.

⁴ The author here begs the question of whether there actually is an "initial and constant" experience of participation, specifically in a supernal act of being. Clearly each reader will have to make a determination on this score.

every instant, a kind of creation of our own being—a being that knows itself in bringing itself forth—which implicates all the conditions of intelligibility. It is therefore anterior to the mysterious classical opposition between subject and object. It justifies it only by transforming it, for the subject and the object now appear situated in a unity containing both, revealing a common parentage which separates them only to show their correlation.

As the reverse of the dialectic of contradiction the dialectic of participation, instead of trying to conquer the world through a series of victories over successive resistances, teaches us to penetrate the world by cultivating within ourselves a plurality of powers the world continually responds to. It cannot be reduced to that artifice of contradiction whereby negation is introduced to the heart of the real in order to give us the pleasure of overcoming it. It does not play the game of posing problems that must already be resolved within being itself in order for us to be able to pose them at all. This game satisfies our ingenuity and self-love but distorts our experience of life which should be that of a gift we have received and which should find in the universe a source of nourishment, a support that is never lacking, and a response not merely invented but truly given—if attention is sufficiently lucid and consent is sufficiently pure. Egotism, consisting of particular desires that never seem to encounter a ready-made delight, places the obstacle in front of us. But the peculiarity of wisdom is to discover the being before us. That should dampen our desires. If instead of turning away from being we try to penetrate and enjoy it we will find that it always surpasses the force of our endless desires; even in the worst destitution our soul is still there, undiminished, along with the whole universe whose secret is present to us, handed over so to speak. Even the processes we think turn us against being are sustained and permitted by being itself. We can indeed say that there is a dialogue⁵ between the I and the world but it is better to say that the world itself is the dialogue. The peculiarity of philosophy is to define the laws that make it possible, and the peculiarity of life is to put them to work.

The All of which we are a part and with which we constantly communicate—experience of *this* is what fills our existence. It obliges us sometimes to posit the All and sometimes to posit the I but always in relation to each other. The world includes me in its existence and I include it in my consciousness. It is therefore with respect to me either enveloping or enveloped. However not in a reciprocal and univocal manner since knowledge has Being as its target, of which it is a part and to which it is always inadequate. This suffices to show that philosophy and life have a serious character only on the condition that the Absolute is not before and outside me as an inaccessible end; rather, I am in it and make my mark in it.

⁵ Early Greek philosophy understands dialectic in terms of a dialogue.

ART. 5: *The steps of our dialectic reside in various mental operations by which participation is realised.*

The analytic method of Aristotle, the synthetic method Descartes borrows from mathematics, the dialectical method whereby Hegel shows us how consciousness tries to free itself from contradiction, all refer to the idea of progressive participation in a being that surpasses us. They describe the means of participation rather than its essence. The logic of participation, it seems, is the most supple and comprehensive of them all. It does not reject the inclusion of concepts, though such inclusion is never more than potential; it does not disdain the principle of non-contradiction, though it considers the alternatives “yes” and “no” as interesting only with respect to particular propositions isolated from their common source in the infinite where they are reconciled. It does not reject the formation of new concepts, though such invention only testifies to our intellectual industry, the existence of other forms of participation (e.g. affective and aesthetic) and the fact that such concept-making always neglects what we receive in favour of what we devise. Finally it rejects neither the opposition between contraries nor their reconciliation, though these are problems internal to participation that do not concern its manifestation and are insufficient for the purpose of grounding either the formal demands of dialectic or the possibility of finding in the real a response capable of satisfying them.

As for the dialectic of participation, it necessarily involves three steps. *First*, description of the primitive fact, treated as thinking by Descartes and as willing by Biran, where one finds that it is not a simple fact from which all other aspects of the real might be deduced but a double-faceted fact, or if you will a relation, according to which my particular being is inserted in the total being, my individual thinking in a universal thinking, and my willing in a universal will. *Second*, description of that total being which is both a universal thinking and an infinite will, which is always posited as grounding the possibility of participation. Here it is legitimate to say that in the measure it surpasses me it is an object of faith though its essence can be found inside me in that I too am a being who thinks and wills, and in that I too can be defined as having the character of self-causation, which far from being a sheer mystery to me is to a certain extent clarified each time I take an initiative, i.e. each time I think or will. And *third*, having posited the reality and the fundament of participation it is necessary to describe its modalities. Now these modalities do not come down to general concepts that must be discovered or simple notions that must be constructed or contradictions that must be overcome. One ought to define them as instruments without which participation would be impossible. For example one would show that participation creates two fundamental correlations: on the one hand between the act and the given that limits yet responds to it, on the other hand between the act and the power that supposes it; though it lies outside it the power exercises it, puts it to work. Now, from the distinction between the

act and the given is derived the distinction between time and space, which are conditions for its realisation, and from the distinction between power and act is derived, as its mode of expression, the distinction between representative intellect⁶ and creative will. Employing these distinctions we can draw – always taking from the act of participation the relation of end to means supposed by it – a schematic tableau of the mind’s basic operations insofar as they correspond to the essential articulations of things. The categories constitute an analysis of the act of participation: they are implied by it. The peculiarity of philosophy is at first to enumerate and deduce them; they should not be considered as general denominations of things or ideal seeds of truth or properties the mind might impose on the real by virtue of its own constitution. They are born along with participation and are implicated in it: to describe participation is enough to bring them to light. They produce the world as it is represented to us, which faithfully expresses the relation between the operation we perform and the given it responds to but does not create. The order among categories is analytic with respect to the living act of participation on which they depend and which they divide into separate powers; it is synthetic with respect to particular determinations that are correlative to one another and systematically interdependent. However one can develop the inventory as far as one likes; the act and the given will be further distinguished and related thereby. In the dialectic of participation there is no initiative of the spirit⁷ that does not give rise to an experience of its confirmation; but there is also no initiative that does not engage our freedom and give a shape to the world corresponding to an act we have made.

ART. 6: The dialectic determines the general and individual correlations between the activity I put into play and the passivity that answers to it.

Allowing that we have daily experience of participation by way of the act that posits our existence relative to the world we still want to know how participation occurs, the means by which it is accomplished. Yet we carry those means within us and constantly put them to work: they are achieved by taking consciousness⁸; and by employing them we make real, living and intelligible the conditions without which participation would not exist. For the universe is presented to us as a unity, and participation offers the same conditions to all beings⁹; if we consider these beings in their finitude alone we see that the peculiarity of participation is not to confine them to their particular natures but to give them

⁶ The intellect that represents things to the mind.

⁷ Or, mind.

⁸ Lavelle refers to many things as “the secret of participation”. I believe these two words give the practical gist of it.

⁹ Essentially *human* beings. Lavelle denies full being to whatever lacks the power of self-determination.

access to a world which is the same for all; participation is always available within them.

We can easily identify the laws that stem from the idea of participation and we can so to speak verify their application to our operations and to all the limiting forms that they might take and that depend on our individual nature, our organs and station in the world, all of which observation alone enables us to define. The dialectic of consciousness is continually justified, enriched and affirmed in a constant confrontation between the internal demands without which our I would have no access to being and the givens which correspond to them; these are always multiplied and affirmed in the measure our activity is exercised. Thus the laws of participation are confirmed by how our unique experience is organised. At the same time this experience, which simultaneously expresses the nature of mankind and the nature of the individual, takes place at the interior of a universe which provides all possible experiences and is their junction so to speak.

But who would venture to say, for example, that participation in the Total Being can be realised in any other way than through an interplay of activity and passivity, with all the particular conditions implied by this relationship and derived from it? We clearly and distinctly see, as Descartes would say, that this rapport might take different forms while being necessary to them all.

Only the being I give myself through an act I accomplish belongs to me. Without it I would not be and there would be nothing for me. It is doubtless by way of it that I penetrate Being. But on one side this act comes up against a passivity—sometimes in the form of an obstacle, sometimes in the form of a possession—and on the other side it reveals to me a superabundant power upon which I continually draw, a power that sustains and renews my operations as well as those of other beings. I am therefore an intermediary between activity and passivity; I join one to the other; my passivity is my activity brought to a halt. However at the same time, through the breadth and richness of the objects and states it brings me, my passivity testifies to the plenitude of my activity, to its purity and value. Without the activity I exert I would be nothing; without the activity that surpasses me and in which I participate the possibility for all beings to take part in Being and to shape a world would be abolished. Finally, without passivity, I would have nothing, I would be alien to all determination, a mere power-to-be rather than a genuine being, I would be encased in my subjective solitude, incapable of setting foot on the real, of knowing and enjoying it.

ART. 7: *The dialectic justifies the appearance of time and space and the experience in which I am situated*¹⁰.

If to understand the world is to make it appear before our eyes thanks to the alternating play of activity and passivity, ever opposed, ever associated, the world must always be for us a given and at the same time an open career in which our activity is constantly engaged. It is therefore both spatial and temporal but in such a way that space offers the will paths among which it can choose, and time witnesses to our passivity with respect to ourselves by imposing on us the burden of the past. Thus is born a dialectic of space and time which will allow us to deduce with respect to the material universe the categories of cause and effect, force and movement, alteration and quality, element and system; thereafter it will allow us to confirm an ordered multiplicity of sensible qualities in such a way as to adjust their specificity to the conceptual acts of our thinking so exactly that it might seem sometimes that experience leads us to become conscious of the acts that found and explain it, and sometimes that our thinking itself evokes intuitions that make it real and complete.

Thus is shaped the experience of ourselves and the world where through the intermediary of time we see the indeterminate possibility of the future forever being changed, there in the instant, into the ineffaceable reality of our past¹¹ and through the intermediary of space, a world standing across from us that nonetheless continually enters into relation with us owing to movement and quality, the first of which allows us to penetrate it and undergo its action and the second of which is the gift of its sensible presence. Space and time cannot be conceived independently of one another since they are impacts on my worldly life that shape the events in my consciousness and since the world itself has existence only owing to the successive views consciousness acquires of it one after another. And my own life is a concrete dialectic, the abstract version of which describes the universal conditions of possibility common to every consciousness. Thus is constituted a world that is the same for all, although it allows individuals to enfold it in perspectives unique to them, to choose objects in accord with their desires and to leave behind impressions that mark their personal destinies. And this whole world will become material for science or art depending on whether I try to reconstruct it through intellectual operations or to penetrate, through a living sympathy, its inmost secret meaning which appearance can either dissimulate or reveal.

It is understood that an analogical deduction is possible regarding the development of our interior life and that it will allow us by turns to justify the opposition between the virtual and the actual, the operation and the state, the possible and the necessary, and the future and the accomplished, which our

¹⁰ Literally “in which I inscribe myself”. Lavelle often speaks of inscription in being.

¹¹ Lavelle here introduces his reverse-flow model of time which follows “the order of existence” rather than “the order of knowledge”, i.e. the usual evolution from past to present to future.

consciousness illustrates through the movements of desire, will, hope and fear, and following from them memory and regret, the role of psychological analysis being here to show their correspondence with all the conceptual conditions which comprise the schema of time and without which no finite being could be detached from the All or inscribe itself in the All in order to realise itself. Thus the dialectic shows us not what things are but how they are formed; it puts us in the presence of an experience we bring forth, i.e. through which we assist¹² in the creation of our own being and the being of the world. At every instant it permits us to verify the law according to which each particular being posits himself as a pure power but must run the gauntlet of the real in order to receive a content that allows him to actualise and take possession of himself. His activity must pass through the three phases of potentiality, actualisation and contemplation¹³ so that he can inscribe his participated existence in the universe that sustains him and that constantly changes its face.

ART. 8: The dialectic posits all the relations between consciousnesses and with the Pure Act.

The discovery of the infinite Act upon which we depend and without which our finite being could neither posit itself nor subsist nor grow requires us to posit the existence of an infinite number of finite beings. Without them one would need to limit the Act's creative power, parcel out the gifts of its measureless generosity and risk taking oneself as the sole mediator between the world and the Pure Act. Indeed the world of space and time would be no more than an illusory display if it did not testify to existences other than my own, each interior to itself like my own existence, and if the world, instead of appearing to exist for itself, did not reveal itself to us—either through what it is or through the use we make of it—as the means afforded us to communicate with each other. God did not create the world, he created souls which can be distinguished and united only through the vehicle of space and time.¹⁴ And it cannot be sufficiently appreciated that in order to be able to discover another worldly being who like us possesses a spiritual initiative, a being we can posit as independent of us though like us and with whom we can somehow unite in spite of our separate bodies, we need to go further than to attribute to him an inwardness like ours by way of a kind of analogical reasoning; we need to have the experience of an inwardness that extends beyond us, at once founding our own inwardness and that of all other minds¹⁵. And to confirm this argument through a kind of logical

¹² The French word *assister* has two main meanings: (1) to help or assist and (2) to attend or be present to something. In Lavelle's philosophy both meanings are valid at once.

¹³ These correspond to future, present and past in Lavelle's reverse-flow time.

¹⁴ Given the importance of these words in the doctrine of the eternal present they should have been italicised by their author.

¹⁵ Or, spirits.

reciprocity one can observe that the discovery of another mind, with which we begin to experience a true contact or communication, requires us to posit the existence of a subjectivity that surpasses us yet is common to us.¹⁶ That there is another man means that God becomes present to us through him.

Consequently it can be said that all relations are relations between man and God and that the relations among men only express the different ways each of us is one with and separate from God. Every individual consciousness is distinct from the others yet one with them. Each recognises within itself, either as a conflict or as an accord between different powers, the conflict or accord it finds in its encounter with all other beings in the world. And for that reason again every individual soul is at the service of the human soul in its entirety, although it too needs the whole of humanity in order to assure its own progress. Thus one sees all beings assembled according to legal forms of organisation through which the will seeks to imitate nature or to enter into more personal and hidden relations which are beyond the legal sphere and where God is the principle. But though natural and social orders imitate the spiritual order after a fashion they do not take its place, and it is even necessary that they harbour a secret disorder so that freedom can be exercised and so that the true order is ever the effect of a choice that depends on us.

ART. 9: There is solidarity among all the steps of the dialectic.

The dialectical movement resides firstly in a process of separation through which being tries to separate from itself in order to take consciousness of itself by way of reflexion. And through a kind of paradox this reflexion is constitutive of its very being. It seems to suppose being and at the same time to add to it. But what it adds is consciousness¹⁷ without which it would be nothing. Thus I begin to oppose myself as part of the All to which I belong yet I envelope the All in a representation, since wherever the mind is put into play it brings universality with it. Within the All I distinguish my own body, which my thinking distances from me as an object but I nonetheless make my own owing to affection. To this body I oppose objects which remain exterior but support my intellectual or material action. And within myself I experience my own finite existence only by at the same time opposing it to an infinite existence, i.e. the source I draw upon and other finite existences who are distinguished from me only so that I might unite with them in a two-fold relationship of cooperation and friendship. Thus the conditions of participation reveal my mixed being, body and soul, which can turn its attention toward either the pure act on which it depends or the worldly spectacle in which it must take a place, encountering on the one hand mere

¹⁶ The point will be given detailed treatment in Chapter Eight "The Pure Self".

¹⁷ In Chapter One consciousness is already fundamentally implicated in being. I assume that what is meant here is consciousness *of* objects rather than consciousness-in-itself, which is frequently referred to as "interiority" or "intimacy".

bodies that are symbols or instruments and on the other hand spirits which, along with it, form a society that testifies to the active and visible presence of God. And the peculiarity of our dialectic is to show the implications of these completely interdependent relations through which each being is constituted thanks to an operation that depends on it and permits it at once to occupy the world and create it.

The dialectic addresses the rapport of every spirit with things, ideas, itself, other spirits and pure spirit, keeping in mind that I can have rapport with another spirit only by way of things and ideas, with pure spirit only by way of another spirit, and that I can conceive of myself only in rapport with another spirit or with pure spirit.